We study the optimal hiring and …ring decisions of a …rm under two di¤erent …ring costs regulations: 1) Dual labor markets characterized by high …ring costs for workers with seniority above a threshold ("permanent workers") and by low costs for "temporary workers". 2) The Single Labor Contract, a policy proposal to make …ring costs increasing in seniority at the job. Our contribution is to focus on the option value implied by both regulations. We show that in the Dual regulation the workers more likely to be …red are those close to become permanent because the …rm tries to keep alive the option to …re at low cost. On the contrary, the Single Contract transfers that maximum …ring to the new hires. Thus, …red workers are …red sooner under the Single Contract. We characterize three other results from comparing both regulations: 1) If both regulations have the same average …ring cost for workers who become permanent, temporary workers are less likely to be …red in the Single Contract. 2) Moreover, this new regulation increases hiring and average employment duration. 3) It also reduces turnover among temporary workers, but at the expense of higher turnover among permanent workers who are more often replaced by temporary workers.
Introduction
With aggregate unemployment rates reaching double digits in many countries, labor market reforms are at the center of the economic policy debate. This is especially the case in southern European countries characterized by "dual labor markets". A concept that describes labor regulations with two main types of contracts: on one side, permanent contracts protected with high …ring costs; on the other side, temporary contracts with low …ring costs that must be upgraded to permanent when worker's seniority at the job reaches a certain threshold.
1 These countries are among those with higher youth unemployment rates (in 2010 about 25% in France and Italy, more than 40% in Spain), and at least half of their young workers have a temporary contract (Scarpetta et al. 2010) . Among the di¤erent policy proposals, one seems especially popular: unifying the Dual Labor regulations into a Single Contract that would have …ring costs increasing in seniority at the job. In this paper we compare the Single Contract and the Dual Labor regulations in a model that explicitly takes into account the option value implied by the di¤erent …ring cost regulations. Under both regulations, to …re before a certain seniority threshold T is similar to an American option that gives the right of …ring at low costs. 3 We show how each regulation a¤ects the value of this option and what are the consequences of these di¤erences. This is the main contribution of the paper. In the model there is a …rm which can be either active or idle. Active …rms employ a worker and make stochastic pro…ts which can be positive or negative. They can …re their worker at any time and become idle by paying a …ring cost. 4 If the …rm is idle it does not employ any worker and its pro…ts are zero. An idle …rm can hire a worker by paying a hiring cost and become active (we assume no matching frictions and perfectly elastic labor supply, i.e. "workers are waiting at the gate").
We model the Dual regulation assuming that the …ring cost is a constant if …ring happens before worker's seniority reaches a threshold T , and a higher constant if …ring happens after T . For the Single Contract we assume that …ring costs start at some positive level and continuously increase with worker's seniority until seniority reaches T: After this threshold the …ring cost is the same constant level than for permanent workers in the Dual Labor.
We show that the optimal …ring rule is not only a function of worker's productivity, but also of both the time to expiration of the option of …ring at low cost, and of the cost of exercising it. Firms with permanent workers do not have that option, thus their …ring behavior only depends on the productivity of the worker. The Dual regulation and the Single Contract di¤er on the timing of the costs of exercising the option, what changes radically the …rm's behavior.
In the Dual regulation the workers more likely to be …red are those close to become permanent because the …rm tries to keep alive the option to …re at low cost. On the contrary, in the Single Contract the option does not have much value for those workers because their …ring costs are close to those of permanent workers. In the Single Contract the maximum …ring happens with new hires because …rms anticipate that the option loses value as worker's seniority increases. Thus, …red workers are …red sooner under the Single Contract.
We also show that if the regulations share the same average …ring cost at T; and the same protection for permanent workers, then the Single Contract increases hiring and reduces turnover among temporary workers, but at the expense of higher turnover among permanent workers who are more often replaced by temporary workers. These results happen because for any duration strictly shorter than T the Single Contract has lower average and cumulative …ring costs. Thus, higher incentives to both hiring and …ring. Overall, the Single Contract generates a higher average time employed. 5 We did comparative statics on the main parameters of the model to check the robustness of the previous results, and to assess the sensitivity of the two regulations. We noticed that when …rms become more impatient (higher discount factor) the Single Contract generates more …ring of temporary workers than the Dual because the anticipation of future costs plays a higher role in the Single Contract. And for high levels of risk aversion the Single Contract provides less incentives to …re, especially transitory workers.
Our paper is related to two literatures: 1) The paper uses techniques from the literature of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994 is an early survey, Cetin and Zapatero 2010, Hugonnier and Morellec 2007 or Miao and Wang 2007, are, among others, recent examples) . Bertola and Bentolila (1990) is closely related. They also study a continuous time partial equilibrium labor demand model. However, their …ring and hiring costs are linear and do not imply any option value. 5 Our results are qualitative. Our model is too stylized for a full quantitative analysis.
2) By the questions studied, our paper complements the search and matching literature that has studied Dual Labor markets (for example, Bentolila et al. 2010 , Cahuc and PostelVinay 2002 , Costain et al. 2011 , Dolado et al. 2007 or Sala et al. 2010 ). And we contribute to the small but growing literature on the Single Contract (Costain et al. 2011 , Garcia-Perez 2009 , Garcia-Perez and Osuna 2011 . Our value added is to focus on the option value implicit in the …ring regulations. To the best of our knowledge, nobody in the literature has done this. We believe this is relevant because when the option value is taken into account the …ring rule is no longer a constant productivity level because the …rm tries to keep alive the option to …re at low cost.
We borrow our solution technique from Carr (1998), who used it to price American put options with …nite maturity in a continuous time model with Brownian motions. The idea is to convert the problem into one of an in…nite-maturity option with a stochastic termination time.
In an online appendix we show that our results hold in a discrete time model solved via value function iteration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 describes the model and Section 3 the solution method. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 performs comparative statics. Section 6 concludes. Proofs and details of the solution method are in an online Appendix.
Model
We analyze an in…nitely-lived …rm in a continuous-time setting. The …rm can be in any of two states: 1) It can be active, employing a worker and receiving a stochastic stream of pro…ts net of wage costs y t ; or 2) it can be idle, have no employee and receive zero net pro…ts. Pro…ts can take either positive or negative values as they evolve as an arithmetic Brownian motion:
where is the expected pro…t growth (in levels) and is the pro…t growth volatility. Both and are constant. An active …rm can …re the worker at any time but it must pay a …ring cost q( ) that depends on how long the worker has been employed in the …rm ( ). We focus on two cost functions:
i) The Dual Labor market, where the cost of …ring a worker is a step function with two levels: if the …red worker has seniority smaller than a threshold T then the …rm has to pay cost q. If the worker has seniority larger than T then the …ring cost is higher (q)
ii) The Single Contract, where …ring costs start at some positive level (q 0 ) and increase linearly with slope q as the worker remains employed. Once seniority attains a threshold T S the …ring cost becomes constant
If the …rm …res its worker it switches to the idle state where net pro…ts are zero. Idle …rms monitor potential pro…ts (y t ) and can hire a worker at any time by paying a hiring cost (c). If they do so they start producing at the next instant. Thus, the …rst pro…t received by an idle …rm that hires a worker at t is y t+" ; for in…nitesimal ":
We assume that the …rm has subjective discount rate and it is risk averse. We follow the recent …nancial literature on …rm's capital structure (Bhamra et al. 2010 or Chen 2010, among others) and assume an exogenous stochastic discount factor una¤ected by the …rm's …ring/hiring policy. The …rm maximizes its value by discounting cash- ‡ows with the stochastic discount factor implied by CARA utility over potential pro…ts:
where is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion: This is equivalent to the problem of a risk-neutral …rm whose discount rate is
and whose risk-adjusted expected pro…t variation is
Since the …rm can decide at each time whether to …re or not, pro…ts before …ring and hiring costs ( t ) can be written as 3 Solving the model Both cost functions (2) and (3) imply that the value of the …rm's option to …re depends on time, because …ring is cheaper if it is done before the employment reaches T or T S : To capture this feature of the option value we will solve the model using a randomizing approximation method proposed by Carr (1998) to price American put options with …nite maturity. The idea is to convert the problem into one of an in…nite-maturity option with a stochastic termination time.
To describe the method let's assume that T = T S and denote it by T S : Carr (1998) method partitions the employment time threshold T S into n subintervals and it assumes that T S is not a deterministic time but a stochastic time denoted byT : The random variableT has mean T S ; and variance V ar T that converges to zero as n ! 1: Thus, the deterministic case can be approximated with any accuracy by the stochastic case by increasing n:
We assume that the employment time ( ) starts in the …rst time interval and switches randomly to the next one when it receives a shock distributed as a continuous time Poisson process with hazard rate n=T S . Thus, the average time expected in the …rst interval is T S n and the variance T S n 2 : The shocks at di¤erent intervals are i:i:d: Thus, the average time to have received n shocks is E T = T S ; and the variance V ar T is
, which converges to zero as n ! 1:
We denote by u a state variable that captures how many shocks have happened, or, in other words, in which interval is the employment time. We can write the …ring cost q( ; u) as a function of u since q( ; u) gets into the ‡at shape of t > T S only after n shocks:
There are n + 1 intervals (the …rst n before T S ; plus the one after T S at which …ring costs are constant). Thus, for example, if n = 2 then u = 0; 1 or 2: The variable u t changes over time depending on the shocks, it evolves as a continuous-time markov chain with intensity n T S . For example, when n = 2 its intensity matrix is
with the third state being an absorbing state. We denote by V (I t = 1; y t ; q t ; u t ) the value function of a …rm employing a worker (I t = 1); receiving pro…ts y t , facing …ring cost function q t which depends on the employment duration, and on interval u t : This …rm must decide an optimal time to …re. This optimal time can be in…nite. If it …res, the …rm will get the discounted continuation value of an idle …rm V (I t = 0; y ; q 0 ; u t = 0). Hence the active …rm's value is V (1; y t ; q t ; u) = max E Z t e rs y s ds e r q + e r V (0; y ; q 0 ; 0)
The …rst term is expected cumulative discounted pro…ts until the time of …ring. The second term captures the …ring costs of …ring a worker of duration : The third term is the continuation value.
The optimal can be expressed as a minimum pro…t level that triggers …ring once attained. We call this pro…t level the …ring boundary, denoted as y(q; u), which depends on costs q (hence seniority at the job), and the state variable u which determines whether costs have switched to constant. For pro…t values above the boundary the …rm prefers to keep the worker. For pro…ts below the boundary the worker is …red and the …rm goes idle. Firing occurs the …rst time the pro…t value y reaches the boundary. This can happen either for a pro…t shock, or for a jump in the state variable u, i.e. passage of time, is the …rm has a higher incentive to …re as senirity at the job increases. Therefore the …rm value will depend on the …ring boundary for all values of u:
When the …rm is idle pro…ts are zero, but it can hire at any time : Its value function is
The …rst term is the discounted value upon hiring at time and becoming an active …rm. The second term captures the hiring costs discounted from the hiring time to the present: There is a critical level of potential pro…ts y that motivates the …rm to hire, we call this the hiring boundary. It separates an inactivity region where low pro…ts discourage the …rm from hiring, from an activity region, where high pro…ts induce the …rm to hire. The hiring boundary depends on hiring costs, the evolution of the pro…ts process, and on …ring costs of the …rm which just hired.
An online Appendix characterize the …ring and hiring boundaries for both regulations and explain our numerical solution. Next section discusses their patterns.
Theoretical predictions
In this Section we analyze the qualitative predictions of the model. Our model is too stylized for a full quantitative analysis. Given the lack of closed form solutions we solve numerically a somewhat plausible parameterization. We checked that the patterns that we discuss are robust to di¤erent parameterizations. Moreover, in Section 5 we study how changes in the parameters a¤ect the results.
Parameterization
Concerning the dynamics of pro…ts (equation 1), we set the deterministic expected pro…t increase to 0:05 and the volatility to 0:14: If we measure pro…ts in units of $100 millions this corresponds to a …rm experiencing $5 million of expected annual pro…t increase, with a standard deviation of $14 millions. 8 Concerning the preference parameters, we set the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion to 3; and the subjective discount rate to 0:15: Section 5 does comparative statics on these parameters. Concerning the …ring costs, to focus on the di¤erences between regulations due to di¤erent shapes of …ring costs instead of di¤erent levels, we study the case when both regulations give the same protection to permanent workers 12) and this maximum protection is attained at the same seniority level
Moreover, we assume that both regulations imply the same average …ring cost for workers whose seniority is T , that is
As we will discuss below, assumption (14) highlights an important feature of the Single Contract. Even if it is designed to have the same average cost as the Dual for workers that become permanent, its cumulative and average costs are necessarily lower for workers hired before T 1 j we assume to be 0:05: This implies a monthly wage of around $1500 for a worker generating an expected annual revenue of $6800 to the …rm, if we assume a pro…t rate of 25% of revenues, and wage costs of 2/3 of revenues (a rough approximation to the labor share in National Income). 9 We assumed q = 45 wage days, and T = 3 given that one period in the model is one year. We set q 0 , q and q in order to meet assumptions (12) (15) with a non-negative q 0 : The hiring cost (c) does not play an important role in the results, we set it to half of the smallest …ring cost (the initial cost of the single contract). 
Results
An active …rm …res its worker when the pro…t level crosses the …ring boundary from above. Hence, a higher …ring boundary implies a higher incentive to …re. An idle …rm hires a worker when the pro…t level crosses the hiring boundary from below. A lower hiring boundary implies a higher incentive to hire.
Panel B of Figure 1 reports the optimal …ring and hiring boundaries under both types of regulations for the benchmark parameterization of Table 1 . The regulations imply very di¤erent …ring patterns, and also di¤erent hiring boundaries. First we discuss each regulation separately, then we compare them:
a) The Dual Labor: for 2 [0; T ] the …ring boundary is increasing in seniority at the job, as seniority approaches T the …rm demands more pro…ts to keep the worker employed. Thus, most of the incentive to …re is concentrated at T: A pattern that is consistent with the empirical evidence and explained by the option value implicit in the Dual Labor. Firms like to have the option to …re at low cost, and they keep it alive by …ring before T . Once the worker reaches T the option disappears.
The slope of the …ring boundary before T is increasing in the gap in …ring costs; and in how close seniority is of T . The …rst e¤ect can be seen in Panel A of Figure 2 , which plots the boundary for a lower value of q while keeping q constant. The higher the labor protection of the permanent worker relative to the temporary, the higher the value of keeping alive the option to …re at low cost. Moreover, a largerimplies more hiring and more …ring around T (the hiring and …ring boundaries are closer): This higher turnover is a "churning e¤ect", once temporary workers get close to T they are …red and (soon) replaced by new hires. The …rm incurs …ring and hiring cost to keep alive the 9 We have 0:05 Figure 1 also shows that the …ring boundary for permanent workers is ‡at and lower than for temporary workers. It is ‡at because now there is no option value, …ring costs are constant. It is lower because permanent workers are protected by higher …ring costs.
b) The Single Contract: the maximum of the …ring boundary is at the start of employment ( = 0) and the …ring boundary decreases in seniority. Two reasons explain these patterns: 1) At = 0 …ring costs are the cheapest. And lower …ring costs encourage more …ring. 2) Firing costs are increasing (up to T ) creating an incentive to …re before costs become more expensive. The expected cost increase is maximal at = 0; and it decreases progressively to zero as costs are closer to the maximum cost, i.e. as seniority gets closer to T . After T the …ring boundary is ‡at and at its lowest level because costs are constant and at their maximum level.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows how the slope of the …ring boundary depends on the slope of cost increase q and on how close seniority is to T . It plots …ring boundaries for larger T s and smaller slopes q of …ring costs, while keeping unaltered the …ring cost after T . We can see that both the intercept and the average slope of the …ring boundary decrease as T becomes larger. The slower the transition to the highest …ring costs the smaller the anticipation e¤ect, and smaller the incentive to …re. The higher q ; the higher the initial incentive to anticipate …ring and the faster the boundary decays as employment time goes by.
From the previous discussion we can draw two conclusions from comparing both regulations: i) Relative to the Dual Labor, the Single Contract transfers most of the incentive to …re from the workers with seniority close to T to those just hired. The extent of this reshaping depends on the rate of cost increase q in the Single Contract. Figure 3 plots a consequence of this reshaping: the average seniority of …red workers is lower in the Single Contract. This happens for both workers …red before (Panel A) and after T (Panel B). As it is intuitive, workers that started at a higher pro…t level have on average been employed more time when …red (it took more time for pro…ts to cross the …ring boundary).
Insert Figure 3 about here ii) If the regulations share the same average …ring cost at T (condition 14) and the same protection for permanent workers (condition 12), then the Single Contract generates more incentive to hire (lower hiring boundary) and higher turnover among permanent workers (the …ring boundary for permanent worker is higher and its distance from the hiring boundary is smaller): Figure 4 con…rms these results. Panel A shows that an unemployed worker has a higher probability of being hired under the Single Contract. Panel B shows that for di¤erent levels of …rm pro…tability the Single Contract has a slightly higher probability of …ring a permanent worker. Panel C shows that the Single Contract has lower probability of …ring a transitory worker except for workers starting in very bad pro…t conditions. These results follow from condition (15), for any duration strictly shorter than T the Single Contract has lower average and cumulative …ring costs. Thus, higher incentives to hire and …re. 
Comparative Statics
In this Section we do two things: on one side to check the robustness of the results discussed in Section 4.2. On the other, to assess how changes in the parameters a¤ect …rm's …ring behavior. We start with the subjective time-discount factor ( ). Panels A and B of Figure  6 plot the …ring boundary as a function of at three di¤erent seniority levels ( = 6 is a permanent worker, = 2:5 is worker close to become permanent, = 0:5 is a worker hired recently). Two e¤ects are at play. On one hand more impatient …rms …re earlier, because they are less willing to tradeo¤ present losses for future pro…ts. On the other hand, high implies that …ring costs today are more expensive relative to future pro…ts, hence an incentive to postpone …ring. For = 0:5 and = 2:5 the …rst e¤ect dominates and the boundary is monotonically increasing in for both regulations: However, for the workers with higher costs ( = 6) when is high enough the second e¤ect dominates and more impatient …rms …re later. Panel C plots the di¤erence between the …ring boundaries of the Dual and the Single as a function of for the same three seniority levels. The Single Contract is more sensitive than the Dual to changes in discount rates at the beginning of the employment relation. Higher makes the Single Contract to generate much more …ring of temporary workers than the Dual. This is a consequence of condition (15) : Firms anticipate the average cost increase and when they are more impatient they ask for higher pro…ts to keep the worker. The closer seniority is of T the smaller the anticipated cost increase, what favors the Single Contract.
Insert Figure 6 about here Figure 7 plots the …ring boundary for di¤erent values of expected risk neutral pro…t variation ( ) : Intuitively, in both regulations there is less …ring when …rms expect higher pro…ts. When the deterministic drift is higher any bad pro…t shock will be more transitory. The shapes of the boundaries are not a¤ected by . And Panel C shows that both regulations seem to react similarly to changes in this parameter.
Insert An increase of implies two opposite e¤ects: 1) As in any standard option, given that payo¤s are asymmetric (exercise in good times, wait in bad times) an increase of the risk-neutral volatility enhances the value of the option to …re and delays …ring. 2) Firing before T is a especial option, it is the option to …re at low cost. To keep this option alive the …rm cannot let the employment duration last more than T: Thus, when higher volatility encourages the …rm to keep this option alive, the …rm …res sooner. E¤ect 1) dominates for our parameterization and in Panels A and B, for both regulations, higher reduces …ring. But Panel C, shows that e¤ect 2) is there, and it is important when comparing both regulations. Panel C plots the Dual Labor when the cost of …ring a permanent worker (the cost gap) in the Dual Labor is in…nite, what makes the option to …re at low cost very valuable. We can see that for new hires e¤ect 1) is still prominent, but close to T an increase of volatility induces the …rm to …re earlier. This is e¤ect 2) in play, more volatile …rms …re sooner to keep alive the option to …re cheap.
Thus, the e¤ects of on both regulations depend crucially on the seniority of the worker. Figure 9 plots the …ring boundary for di¤erent values of the risk aversion coe¢ cient at two di¤erent seniority levels ( = 6 is a permanent worker, = 0:5 is a worker hired recently):
Insert Figure 9 about here Panels A and B show that for both seniority levels, both regulations display a non-monotonic pattern of the …ring boundary with respect to an increase in risk aversion. This is explained by equations (5) and (6) : Higher risk-aversion lowers via equation (6) and, initially, increases the discount rate r of equation (5). As in Figures 6 and 7 , both e¤ects push for early …ring. However, further increases of reduce r and induce the …rm to …re less. Panel C reports the di¤erence between the …ring boundaries of the Dual Labor and the Single Contract. It shows that for high levels of risk aversion the Single Contract provides less incentives to …re, especially transitory workers.
Conclusions
In this paper we use a real options model to study …ring and hiring under two di¤erent regulations: the Dual Labor market and the Single Contract. We focus on the option value implied by these regulations. We show that it implies that for temporary workers the optimal …ring rule is a function of their seniority because the …rm tries to keep alive the option to …re at low cost. Relative to Dual regulations, the Single Contract transfers most of the incentive to …re from workers close to become permanent to new hires. Thus, …red workers are …red sooner under the Single Contract. However, if both regulations have the same average …ring cost for workers who become permanent, temporary workers are less likely to be …red in the Single Contract. Moreover, the Single Contract increases hiring and average employment duration. It also reduces turnover among temporary workers, but at the expense of higher turnover among permanent workers who are more often replaced by temporary workers. These result may be especially important in a model where workers can invest in human capital. Or in a model with search costs or other frictions related to turnover.
Our model focused on qualitative patterns and abstracted from several dimensions important in quantitative work, for example, di¤erentials in wage and productivity between workers of di¤erent seniority, or general equilibrium e¤ects. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX I (NOT FOR PUBLICATION): DISCRETE TIME VERSION
This appendix shows that the main qualitative results of the manuscript hold in a discretetime formulation of the problem. Equation (1) in the manuscript is replaced by
where and are the constant yearly mean and standard deviation of pro…t variation, while is the time step as a fraction of a year. Thus, the discrete time problem of the …rm is (2) where all the notation is as in the manuscript.
Discrete Time Solution
Now we do not need to solve the model with the randomizing approximation of Carr (1998). Thus, the state variable u does not appear. As in the paper, we denote by V (1; y; ) the …rm's value conditional on being active and employing a worker.
2 V (0; y) denotes the …rm's value conditional on being idle, a function of pro…tability alone. The Bellman equation of the active …rm is:
V (1; y; ) = max
where y 0 denotes next period pro…t and the …ring cost q( ) is either as in the Single Contract or the Dual Labor regulation. The Bellman equation of the idle …rm is:
The …ring boundary is the smallest pro…t level for which the …rm continues active and does not …re:
The hiring boundary is the highest pro…t level for which the idle …rm continues idle and does not hire:
Thus the …rm's value (2) can be characterized as:
V (1; y; ) if I t 1 = 1 and y t 1 > y( ) V (0; y) if I t 1 = 1 and y t 1 < y( ) V (1; y; ) if I t 1 = 0 and y t 1 > y V (0; y) if I t 1 = 0 and y t 1 < y
Discrete Time Results
We solve the model numerically following the benchmark parameterization of Table 1 in the manuscript. Figure 1Appendix reports the discrete time version of Figure 1B Quantitative values are di¤erent because the closest we get of the continuous time limit is at weekly frequency ( = 1=52). As the length of the time period increases from weekly to monthly or quarterly, the …rm faces more risk because the …rm's decision lasts for more time (i.e., less ability to time the employment situation). As a consequence the …ring/hiring option is worth more and exercised more conservatively. Both …ring and hiring are deferred. However, the Single Contract is much more a¤ected as the length of the time period increases because its …ring cost was continuously increasing. 
Numerical Method.
We discretize the state-space by setting an equispaced grid of n = 300 realizations for profitability y, with lower bound y 1 = 0:5 and upper bound y n = 0:5: We consider an equispaced grid of employment time ranging from 0 to T = 3 years. This is the duration of the temporary phase in both Single Contract and Dual Labor regulation in the baseline parameterization of Table 1 . How dense is the grid depends on the time step : For instance, at monthly frequency the grid for comprises 36 + 1 elements. 3 We jointly obtain the value function conditional on being active, V (1; y; ), and idle, V (0; y), by means of the following iteration, which uses Monte Carlo simulation and linear interpolation to compute expectations of next period value functions We iterate
until the convergence criterion
is satis…ed. Where y 0 s denotes the s-th of n s simulated realizations of next period pro…ts, obtained from the current level y i using (1), with risk-neutral parameters.
The value function corresponding to a given realization y Hence the iteration becomes:
The algorithm then proceeds backwards as in (7). At the last iteration before convergence, we record …ring and hiring boundaries as
:
ONLINE APPENDIX II (NOT FOR PUBLICATION): SOLUTION BOUNDARIES 1 Characterization of solution boundaries
To simplify notation, in this appendix we denote the risk neutral drift ; de…ned in equation (6) of the manuscript; simply by :
Proposition 1: The Single Contract
We follow the line of reasoning of Jobert and Rogers (2006) . We assume that the …ring boundary is monotonically increasing in time until the permanent phase, so that y(q; v 1 ) < y(q; v 2 ) if v 2 > v 1 : This allows us to handle the most general case and discuss jointly the Single Contract and the Dual Labor. If the opposite monotonicity holds, as it turns out for the Single Contract, the modi…cations needed will become clear from the context. We let Y u denote a discrete variable that takes value v if pro…tability y is between the …ring boundaries y(q; v) and y(q; v 1): If Y = v when time to permanent phase is u = v 1; and the time lapse causes a jump of u to v, pro…tability will be immediately in the …ring region. The need to take into account the possibility of …ring because of the simple passage of time, and not only shocks to pro…tability, implies that Y u is a state variable. Of course immediate …ring by time lapse cannot take place if the …ring boundary decreases as time goes by, thus Y u is not a state variable in this case.
The value functions and the optimal hiring and …ring boundaries are determined by the Hamilton Bellman Jacobi (HBJ) equations, the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions. The …rm's value function in the idle state depends on …ring costs only through the initial …ring cost q 0 , hence it does not depend on the state variables u and Y u :
We denote by V the vector of …rm's value functions in all possible states of u (time to permanent phase), I (idle or active), and position Y u : For position to be relevant the …rm must be active, which implies that the number of possible position states depends on u: In particular, if u = v; pro…tability y cannot be smaller than y(q; v) for the …rm to be active, so that there are N (v) = n + 1 v possible position states. Since there are n + 1 time states u for the active …rm, and an inactive state (the last entry), the vector V comprises (n+1)(n+2)=2+1 conditional value functions. It reads explicitly V = [V (1; y; q; 0; Y 0 ) : : : ; V (1; y; q; u; Y u ); : : : V (1; y; q; n; Y n ); V (0; y)] 0 ; Y u = 1; 2; : : : ; N (u) and u = 0; 1; : : : ; n, in this order. The following expression reports the system of HJB equations that hold when pro…tability y is in the continuation regions.
( I = 1 : y 2 (y(q; u); 1); u = 0; 1; : : : ; n I = 0 : y 2 ( 1; y)
The …rst (n + 1)(n + 2)=2 equations in (1) are the ordinary di¤erential equations that the value function of the active …rm satis…es when the expected marginal …rm value arising from keeping the employee exceeds the marginal value induced by …ring the employee and switching to inactive. The last equation in (1) is satis…ed by the inactive …rm when the expected marginal …rm value arising from staying idle exceeds the marginal value induced by hiring the employee and switching to active. The last equation is autonomous, because the …rm cannot change state just because time elapses, but only if the pro…t is high enough. is a square is a Markov transition matrix of dimension (n + 1)(n + 2)=2 + 1; which governs the transition of the value function when employment time lapses and u switches to the next state. It is built according to the transition possibilities of V: The row corresponding to V (1; y; q; u; Y u ) will have r k on the main diagonal, then all zeros except k in the last column if Y u = u+1 (because immediate …ring occurs, leading to the idle …rm value); or k in the column corresponding to V (1; y; q; u + 1; Y u ) otherwise. q =diag[ q ; q ; : : : ; q ; 0; 0]: Note that the second to last entry, corresponding to the active …rm in the permanent phase, does not depend on q and has only one possible value for Y u : 1 denotes a vector of ones except zero in the last entry. The value matching condition (2) says that for the active …rm (I = 1) in the proximity of the boundary (Y u = u + 1), immediate …ring is convenient in the cost regime u at the critical pro…t y(q; u), if the active …rm value function at y(q; u) coincides with the inactive …rm value function once …ring costs are subtracted from pro…ts, hence the value function is continuous at y(q; u) V (1; y(q; u); q; u; u + 1) = V (0; y(q; u)) q; u = 0; 1; : : : ; n
The same must be true for the hiring action: when the …rm is inactive its value at the hiring boundary y coincides with the active …rm value net of hiring costs:
Since the …ring boundaries are selected optimally, the marginal value of choosing a slightly di¤erent boundary must be equal when the …rm passes to a di¤erent position state, including from active to idle. Indeed idleness can just be seen as an additional position state. Hence the smooth pasting condition (4) imposes continuity of the derivative of the value function with respect to y at all boundaries: @ @y V (1; y(q; v 1); q; u; v) = @ @y V (1; y(q; v 1); q; u; v 1); v = u + 2; : : : ; n u = 0; 1; : : : ; n (4) @ @y V (1; y(q; v 1); q; u; v) = @ @y V (0; y(q; v 1)); v = u + 1; u = 0; 1; : : : ; n
We will guess that the solution for V takes the following form and we will check that our guess is correct:
where the (n + 1)(n + 2)=2 + 1 dimensional square matrix F solves the following matrix equation.
The exponential in (6) is a matrix exponential. 1 Note that the last HJB equation in (1) is an autonomous equation of the form
(10) has a solution of the form d exp(c y); for some constant d and constant c = ( + p 2 + 2r 2 )= 2 . The last term of V is the value function in the inactive state: when y ! 1 it never hires a worker and its value converges to that of a perpetually idle …rm, 0; so that c must be positive. To impose this property, we partition F as
1 Given an n n real matrix X, its matrix exponential exp(X) is de…ned in terms of the power series representation:
An important property of the matrix exponential: with f 2 = (
Substituting (11) into (9) we realize that F solves
is without the last two rows, and similarly q : The selected solution for the matrix F is such that F has all its eigenvalues negative except the last one because when y ! 1 the …rm never …res and its value converges to the present value of a perpetual stream of pro…ts: y + . When the …rm is active, the continuation region depends on the state of the factor u. In particular, when u = 0; 1; : : : ; n 1, the …ring boundary is linear in …ring costs (hence in employment time) and it stays …xed to a constant value when there is a transition to u = n, which approximates the occurrence of the deterministic time T u .
We express the constant …ring boundary in the constant cost phase as aq U +b n to emphasize that if the random cost switching time coincided with T u there would be no discontinuity between the boundaries, and y(q; n 1) would converge to y(q; n) as ! T u . Because of the approximation error, instead, we have b n 1 6 = b n . When n is large, we have b n 1 b n and y(q; n 1) ! y(q; n) as ! T u . If the …rm is inactive, the hiring boundary y depends on costs only through the constant initial value q 0 and it is constant. Taking into account (6), the value matching and smooth pasting conditions above read 
where e 1 = [1; 0; 0; ], e 2 = [0; 1; 0; ] and so on. Substituting (13) into (14), setting = aF and a = 1 , we obtain the following system of equations, that determines constants
: :,b n ; y, and the (n + 1)(n + 2)=2 + 1 dimensional constant vector :
We have proven the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 An active …rm …res its worker and switches to idle when the pro…t of the investment opportunity, y, crosses from above the …ring boundary y(q; u), which takes the piecewise linear form
with a = 1= . If current contract duration is 2
If y is below the boundary then immediate …ring occurs. When current pro…tability y is between y(q; v) and y(q; v 1); with v = u + 1; ; n; and the state of the employment phase is u; the …rm values is V (1; y; q; u; v) = e 0 (e yF +q
where e is a column vector with 1 in the [u(u + 1)=2 + v u] th position and zero otherwise.
F is the matrix in (11), and = r , = 1 r . When the …rm is not employing a worker, it hires one when the pro…t of the investment opportunity, y, crosses from below the boundary y. If y is above the boundary then immediate hiring occurs. The …rm's value reads
The hiring boundary y, the constants (b 0 ; : : : ; b n 1 ; b n ), and constant vector solve the system of equations (15).
Proposition 2: The Dual Labor
We apply the same reasonong of the Single Contract case, taking into account that we lose one state variable (q), hence the …ring boundary is constant in each employment time state u; and the vector of …rm values becomes V = [V (1; y; 0; Y 0 ) : : : ; V (1; y; u; Y u ); : : : V (1; y; n; Y n ); V (0; y)] 0 ; Y u = 1; 2; : : : ; N (u) and u = 0; 1; : : : ; n, in this order. We state the following Proposition, whose derivation is an obvious adaptation of the derivation of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 An active …rm …res its worker and switches to idle when the pro…t of the investment opportunity, y, crosses from above the …ring boundary y(u), which takes (n + 1) distinct values depending on the value of the …ring cost factor u, for u = 0; 1; : : : ; n. If current contract duration is
If y is below the boundary then immediate …ring occurs. When current pro…tability y is between y(v) and y(v 1); with v = u + 1; ; n; and the state of the employment phase is u; the …rm values is
exp( ) above is a matrix exponential,
. When the …rm is not employing a worker, it hires one when the pro…t of the investment opportunity, y, crosses from below the boundary y. If y is above the boundary then immediate hiring occurs. The …rm's value reads
The hiring boundary y, the …ring boundaries y(u), and the constant vector solve the system of equations:
. . .
Numerical implementation
This Appendix explains how we constructed the …gures reported in Sections 4 and 5. Figure 1 . The boundaries plotted in Panel B are characterized in Proposition 1 (Single Contract) and Proposition 2 (Dual Labor), and they have been obtained using n = 35 states for the state variable u in the Single Contract, and n = 25 in the Dual Labor: The parameters used are reported in Table 1 . Each state of u has been mapped into employment duration: if current contract duration is 2 h vT n ; (v+1)T n , v n, then u t = v: An interpolating curve with a modest degree of smoothing has been applied between the discrete realizations of the …ring boundaries y(q; 0); y(q; 1); : : : ; y(q; 35) for the Single Contract and those of the Dual Labor, y(0); y(1); : : : ; y(25). 
P ( T jy 0 ; = 0) and E[ jy 0 ; T; = 0] denote, respectively, the probability that …ring occurs before the end of the temporary phase (conditional on present pro…ts and employment being at the starting values), and the expected …ring time conditional on …ring having occurred before the end of the temporary phase. These quantities can be computed from the density of the …rst passage time from zero of the Brownian Motion with deterministic drift b y t ; where
as discussed on Karatzas and Shreve (1991)
where
and
and dP ( tjy 0 ; = 0) is the probability density of the …rst passage time distribution: We report quantities (25) and (26) computed by Monte-Carlo simulation: Figure 1 , Panel A reports the probability that an unemployed worker (initial level of pro…ts y 0 = 0:0826 < y) is hired before some time S, reported on the x axis, under each labor legislation. This probability, corresponds to (29) above, with T replaced by S and the …ring boundary replaced by the constant hiring boundary. It is computed as detailed in the description of Figure 3 . Since hiring boundaries are constant, the relative patterns would not change for di¤erent levels of initial pro…ts. Panel C reports the probability of being …red during the temporary phase for a new hired worker ( = 0); conditional on di¤erent levels of the initial pro…ts y 0 : This probability, corresponds to (29) above, and it is computed as in Figure 3 . Panel B reports the same probability for a worker 2 We apply importance sampling in order to reduce the estimation error, using the property:
where under the probability measure Q; y evolves as:
Q being a standard Brownian motion under Q: Simulating y under Q, with d = 1:5; and estimating the right hand side of (31) achieves a signi…cant variance reduction in the estimation of (30), because of the higher number of …ring events occurring with a smaller drift.
at the beginning of the permanent phase ( = T S = T ) and the event of …ring during the next 10 years. Panel D considers 15 years of future employment history for a worker who enters the job market at time 0, for several initial levels of pro…tability y 0 . If the initial pro…tability is below the hiring boundary the worker starts unemployed. The panel reports the expected cumulative time spent employed out of the 15 years. This cumulative time is computed as follows: we simulate n = 500000 paths of 15 years of …rm's pro…ts with 250 discretization steps per year, conditional on a given initial pro…tability level y 0 and the …ring and hiring boundary of each regulation. At each point in time, for each path, we record the employment status by the relative position of current pro…ts with respect to the …ring and hiring boundary. The approximate expected cumulative time spent employed is E Z 15y 0 [1(y t > y(q t ; t ))1(I t 1 = 1) + 1(y t >y)1(I t 1 =0)] ds j y 0 where I t is an indicator function that has value 0 if the …rm is not employing. Figure 6 . The …gure plots the …ring boundaries obtained by changing r through variations of . They have been obtained using n = 10 states for the state variable u and seven distinct values of the discount rate, = (0; 0:04; 0:08; 0:12; 0:15; 0:17; 0:2), and then interpolating between these values. Each state of u has been mapped into employment duration: if current contract duration is 2 h vT n ; (v+1)T n , v n, then u t = v: Figure 7 has been obtained as in Figure 6 , but changing the risk neutral expected pro…t variation and keeping the rest of the parameters as in Table 1 . Figure 8 plots the …ring boundaries of the Single Contract (Panel A) and of the Dual Labor (Panel B) obtained by changing the risk neutral volatility of pro…t variation ; and keeping the rest of the parameters as in Table 1 . Panel C reports the …ring boundaries of the Dual Labor corresponding to di¤erent volatility levels (under the risk-neutral probability measure) when the option to …re expires at employment duration = T ; that is, assuming permanent workers cannot be …red. It is the limiting case of our model when the permanent …ring cost q is in…nite, so that the …ring boundary in the permanent phase is y(q t ; ) = 1; 2 (T d ; 1). We adapted Proposition 2 to retrieve the …ring and hiring policy for 2 [0; T d ]: Referring to the proof of Proposition 2, it is convenient to partition V 1 (the vector of the active …rm values in each state of the factor u that determines the switch of the …ring cost phase) as V 1 = [V (1; y; q); V n (1; y)] 0 , where V (1; y; q) = [V 0 (1; y; q); V 1 (1; y; q); : : : ; V n 1 (1; y; q)] 0 : When u = n the worker is permanent, and the …rm's value is given by the expected discounted value of a constant ‡ow of pro…ts y s , because we are assuming no …ring. Thus, V n (1; y) = y r + r 2 : In the idle state we denote the …rm's value as V 0 = V (0; y). As in Proposition 2, the …ring and hiring boundaries are characterized by the Bellman equations solved by the continuation value of the …rm in each state of the temporary phase, the value matching and the smooth-pasting conditions: 
where is the following n n dimensional matrix 
Solutions for V and V 0 take the following form: 
The rest of the proof follows Proposition (2). Figure 9 plots the …ring boundaries for seven values of the risk aversion parameter =
(1:5; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 6:2): We used n = 10 states for the state variable u; and interpolated the boundaries between the values. All parameters are those of Table 1 
